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Abstract: Power grids are undergoing a digital transformation are therefore becoming increasingly complex. As a result 
of this they are also becoming vulnerable in new ways. With this development come also numerous risks. 
Cybersecurity is therefore becoming crucial for ensuring resilience of this infrastructure which is critical to 
safety of humans and societies. Risk analysis of cybersecurity in the context of smart power grids is, however, 
particularly demanding due to its interdisciplinary nature, including domains such as digital security, the 
energy domain, power networks, the numerous control systems involved, and the human in the loop. This 
poses special requirements to cybersecurity risk identification within smart power grids, which challenge the 
existing state-of-the-art. This paper proposes a customized four-step approach to identification and modelling 
of cybersecurity risks in the context of smart power grids. The aim is that the risk model can be presented to 
decision makers in a suitable interface, thereby serving as a useful support for planning, design and operation 
of smart power grids. The approach applied in this study is based on parts of the "CORAS" method for model-
based risk analysis. The paper also reports on results and experiences from applying the approach in a realistic 
industrial case with a distribution system operator (DSO) responsible for hosting a pilot installation of the 
self-healing functionality within a power distribution grid. The evaluation indicates that the approach can be 
applied in a realistic setting to identify cybersecurity risks. The experiences from the case study moreover 
show that the presented approach is, to a large degree, well suited for its intended purpose, but it also points 
to areas in need for improvement and further evaluation. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Advanced and innovative capabilities are steadily 
emerging and being deployed on the top of the 
traditional power grids. Such modern power grids are 
often called smart grids. New kinds of software and 
hardware technologies are enablers while increased 
needs for power grid efficiency are the driving forces 
for this development, which is characterized as power 
grid digitalization. With this development come also 
numerous cybersecurity risks that are more or less 
specific to complex cyber-physical systems which 
include many dependencies.  
The smart grid vision implies extensive use of 
"ICT", i.e. information and communication 
technology, in the power system, enabling increased 
flexibility and functionality and thereby meeting 
future demands and strategic goals. Consequently, 
power system reliability will increasingly depend on 
ICT components and systems (Tøndel et al., 2017). 
While adding functionality, ICT systems also 
contribute to failures. To analyse the risks of this 
complex and tightly integrated cyber-physical power 
system, there is a need to identify the new 
vulnerabilities that are introduced due to the 
increasing usage of ICT technologies and their 
interdependencies with the physical power grid. 
The digitalization of the power system will 
include new concepts based on intelligent sensors in 
the grid and efficient communication between these 
sensors and the Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) system or distribution 
management system (DMS) (Belmans, 2012). New 
components and technologies, such as self-healing 
grids, will enable automation of the power grid, 
which will lead to reduced time for fault- and 
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 interruption handling, but will at the same time 
introduce new vulnerabilities and threat scenarios, 
leading to unwanted incidents. One example of how 
adversaries can exploit the new components and 
technologies, is the cyber-attack against the 
Ukrainian Power Grid in December 2015, where the 
outages affected approximately 225 000 customers 
that lost power across various areas (Lee et al., 2016). 
The new architectures of the ICT dominated power 
system will increase the complexity and therefore 
calls for approaches to identify the cybersecurity risks 
of the complex cyber-physical power system.  
Risk modelling is a technique for risk 
identification and assessment, and the state-of-the-art 
offers several tree-based and graph-based notations. 
Fault Tree Analysis (IEC, 1990), Event Tree Analysis 
(IEC, 1995) and Attack Trees (Schneier, 1999) are 
examples of the former and provide support for 
reasoning about the sources and consequences of 
unwanted incidents, as well as their likelihoods. 
Cause-Consequence Analysis (Nielsen, 1971), 
CORAS (Lund et al., 2010), and Bayesian networks 
(Ben‐Gal, 2008) are examples of graph-based 
notations. CORAS is a tool-supported and model-
driven approach to risk analysis that is based on the 
ISO 31000 risk management standard (ISO, 2009). It 
uses diagrams as a means for communication, 
evaluation and assessment. Markov models (IEC, 
2006), CRAMM (Barber and Davey, 1992), 
OCTAVE (Alberts et al., 2003), Threat Modelling 
(Microsoft, 2018) and a number of others, have also 
been applied to support risk analysis. A framework 
for studying vulnerabilities and risk in the electricity 
supply, based on the bow-tie model, has been 
developed and is published for instance in (Kjølle and 
Gjerde, 2015, Kjølle and Gjerde, 2012, Hofmann et 
al., 2012). As stated in (Tøndel et al., 2017) the 
current methods for risk analysis of power systems 
seem unable to take into account the full array of 
intentional and accidental threats. In addition, they 
found few methods and publications on identification 
of interdependencies between the ICT and power 
system (Tøndel et al., 2017). However, as they stand, 
none of the existing approaches provides the support 
that meets specific needs for cybersecurity risk 
analysis of smart power grids. Power grids are namely 
characterized by very high complexity and a 
significant degree of interdependencies. As a critical 
infrastructure which is undergoing a rapid digital 
transformation, these cyber-physical systems are 
safety critical and their cybersecurity is becoming 
crucial. They include assets such as physical power 
network, communication protocols, control systems, 
human in the loop, and many emerging types of 
hardware and software such as sensors, remote 
decision support systems, algorithms for automatic 
response to failures, load balancing, etc. These assets 
constitute the building blocks for the on-going 
digitalization efforts, as a means for enabling the 
power grids of meeting the future needs in terms of 
capacity, efficiency and reliability. Many of the 
solutions are new to the domain and there is a lack of 
formerly established experiences with regard to their 
strengths and weaknesses. The complexity and the 
lack of prior empirical knowledge contribute to the 
inherent uncertainty and the overall risk picture. 
Moreover, the interdisciplinary nature of such 
systems poses requirements on comprehensibility of 
the design of smart power grids and the 
corresponding risk models. Since the emerging 
solutions are at their early stages, there is a lack of 
historical data and operational experiences that could 
constitute relevant input to the risk models. Even if 
such data exists, it is of a limited scope and precision 
in the context of smart power grids. A smart grid 
setting which includes a complex and critical cyber 
physical system, human in the loop, uncertainty due 
to lack of knowledge, many dependencies and 
interdisciplinary aspects, challenges the state-of-the-
art on cybersecurity management within the power 
distribution sector. This indicates a need for an 
approach to cybersecurity risk identification which is 
customized to meet the following requirements (the 
ordering is arbitrary and does not express the relative 
the importance of the requirements):  
1. The approach is cost-effective and light-weight, 
i.e. the benefits of using it are well worth the 
effort.  
2. The cyber risk model can be developed and easily 
understood by the involved actors who represent 
varying roles and background.  
3. The risk model has sufficient expressive power to 
capture relevant aspects of the cybersecurity risk 
picture in the context of smart power grids. 
4. The risk model facilitates inclusion of the 
information that is available, while not requesting 
unrealistic degree of precision.  
5. The risk model can visualize the cybersecurity 
relevant dependencies and sequence of 
states/events both for the whole context and for 
the detailed parts of the scope of analysis.  
This paper proposes a customized four-step approach 
to identification of cybersecurity risks in the context 
of smart power grids. The aim is that the risk model 
can be presented to human in a suitable interface, 
thereby serving as a useful support for decision 
making during design and operation. 
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Table 1: Constructs of the cybersecurity risk modelling language. 
 
 
The approach applied in this study is, to a high 
degree, based on parts of the previously mentioned 
CORAS method for model-based risk analysis. 
Compared to CORAS, the process and the modelling 
approach we have applied are simplified and partially 
adapted in order to meet the five above specified 
requirements. 
The paper also reports on results and experiences 
from applying the approach in a realistic industrial 
case study together with a power distribution system 
operator (DSO) responsible for hosting a pilot 
installation of the self-healing functionality within a 
medium voltage (MV) grid. The results indicate 
feasibility and usefulness of the approach. Important 
lessons have been learned on our approach to risk 
identification as well as about the cybersecurity of the 
power grid domain. This work has been carried out 
within the CINELDI research centre (CINELDI, 
2018) that performs research on the future intelligent 
energy distribution grids. The centre gathers a 
significant number of the major public and private 
actors from the energy sector in Norway. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In 
Section 2 we briefly present the research strategy 
applied. Our method for cybersecurity risk 
identification is presented in Section 3. The setup and 
the results from the trial of the method are outlined in 
Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the results, before 
concluding in Section 6. 
2 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Figure 1 illustrates the steps of our research strategy, 
which is in line with the design science approach 
(Wieringa, 2014). Although Figure 1 illustrates 
sequential steps, the method was carried out 
iteratively where some of the steps were revisited 
during the process. 
In Step 1, we identified the five requirements for 
a model-based risk identification approach 
customized for smart power grids based on the 
background and needs as explained in Section 1. In 
Step 2, we developed the risk identification approach 
based on state-of-the-art approaches with respect to 
the requirements identified in Step 1. The method 
consists of four main phases, namely: context 
establishment, risk identification, risk model 
validation, and follow-up. The method is explained in 
detail in Section 3. 
Finally, in Step 3 we evaluated the approach in an 
industrial setting together with a DSO that is currently 
hosting a pilot on self-healing functionality in their 
power grid. The evaluation was carried out as 
follows. First, we established the context and gained 
a deep understanding of the self-healing functionality, 
based on reports on state of the practice, dialogue 
with domain experts who participated in the analysis 
group, as well as the documentation provided by the 
DSO. Then, we developed a preliminary version of 
the risk model which focused on cybersecurity 
aspects of reliable energy supply. Thereafter, we 
presented the preliminary version of the risk model to 
the DSO, i.e. the power distribution company that was 
the use case provider. 
 
 
Figure 1: Research strategy. 
The company provided their feedback to our risk 
model. Next, the company presented results of a risk 
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 assessment that they had previously carried out. Their 
assessment had focused on preservation of human 
safety in the context of self-healing. Both the 
feedback and the risk assessment of the company 
were used as a basis to revise our risk model. This 
feedback-correction interaction was carried out in 
several iterations. This was followed by a final 
revision that involved updating the model according 
to the predefined scope. As the final step of the 
evaluation, we exposed the model to a list of future 
scenarios that had independently been developed in 
two workshops by industry experts in the CINELDI 
research centre. The complete evaluation process is 
presented in Section 4. 
3 METHOD FOR 
CYBERSECURITY RISK 
IDENTIFICATION – THE 
MODELLING APPROACH AND 
THE PROCESS  
Our method for cybersecurity risk identification 
consists of four main phases, inspired by the CORAS 
method and modelling language, but simplified and 
customized in order to address our specific 
requirements listed in Section 1. The method is to be 
carried out by an analysis group, consisting of 
analysts and domain experts, representing 
competence in risk analysis, cybersecurity, and smart 
power grids. One individual may cover one or more 
roles, and several individuals may represent a similar 
role. Most importantly, the composition of the 
analysis group needs to include the relevant 
competence and ensure a sufficient degree of 
continuity (with respect to attendance of some of the 
participants) within the group. The four phases of the 
process include: 
1. Context establishment 
2. Risk identification 
3. Risk model validation 
4. Follow-up  
The objective of Phase 1 is to characterize the scope 
and the target of the analysis. Stakeholders that the 
analysis is being performed on behalf of, time 
perspective, relevant terminology, assumptions, roles 
and participants of the analysis group, as well as the 
information sources are, moreover, specified. Assets, 
that is the values that will drive the focus of the 
analysis, are also defined. This phase produces 
descriptions, insights and a common understanding of 
the target of analysis. The target of the analysis is 
specified and modelled with respect to capabilities, 
structure, dataflow, workflow, etc. The existing target 
specifications (i.e. those which are available prior to 
the analysis) may be reused or referred to.  
The objective of Phase 2 is to identify the relevant 
risk model elements and develop a risk model. The 
risk model elements may be of the following types: 
vulnerabilities, threat scenarios and unwanted 
incidents. The unwanted incidents are the elements 
that may harm the assets defined during Phase 1. The 
very first step of this phase is to introduce the types 
of the model elements to the analysis group. A brief 
introduction to the modelling constructs and their 
simple explanations is illustrated in Table 1. The 
explanations in the last column are simplified 
wordings inspired by corresponding definitions from 
CORAS. Note that the definition of vulnerability 
from the energy sector is slightly different, namely 
"Vulnerability is an expression for the problems a 
system faces to maintain its function if a threat leads 
to an unwanted event and the problems the system 
faces to resume its activities after the event occurred. 
Vulnerability is an internal characteristic of the 
system" (Kjølle and Gjerde, 2015). Thereafter, the 
identification of risks through a risk modelling 
activity using the constructs in Table 1, is initiated. 
The constructs are, as a part of this process, annotated 
with descriptive text. The relationships between the 
model constructs are expressed with arcs connecting 
the relevant elements, thus resulting in a risk model 
shaped as an acyclic directed graph. The analysts 
shall facilitate the model development by iteratively 
posing questions on risks that may harm the assets 
and the possible vulnerabilities and threat scenarios 
that cause those risks. The analysts shall also 
contribute with cybersecurity domain knowledge 
during the risk modelling. The analysts shall, 
moreover, ensure that the syntax of the risk model is 
consistent. The domain experts shall, during the risk 
modelling, contribute with the domain knowledge on 
power grids. Discussion is facilitated in order to align 
the different domains and reveal the relevant risks- At 
the same time, the context description from Phase 1 
is actively used. Moreover, if needed, refined 
descriptions of selected model elements are provided. 
For some parts of the risk model, it may be 
appropriate to express uncertainties and assumptions, 
in form of supplementary information or within the 
model. 
Phase 3 aims at validating the risk model 
developed in the preceding phase. That is, the model 
should be exposed to quality assurance based on 
various and complementing kinds of empirical input, 
in order to ensure an acceptable level of uncertainty. 
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 The uncertainty may origin from insufficient 
information or knowledge, or from variability in 
context, usage, etc. This is followed by adjustments 
of the model with respect to the structure and the 
individual elements. Eventually, the model is 
approved if the evaluation shows that the revised 
version is sufficiently complete, correct and certain. 
 
 
Figure 2: The centralized self-healing design studied. SH-
nodes are the self-healing nodes consisting of fault 
indicators and remotely controlled switches. 
The objective of Phase 4 is two-fold, namely 
communication and maintenance of the results. The 
specific tasks of this phase include summary of most 
critical findings, evaluations of validity and reliability 
of the risk model, recommendations of risk 
treatments, summary of uncertainties in the findings, 
communications of the results to the relevant 
stakeholders. Maintenance of the risk model involves 
monitoring of assumptions and the context changes 
that require updates of the risk model. 
4 TRIAL OF THE METHOD ON 
AN INDUSTRY PILOT WITH 
SELF-HEALING CAPABILITY 
This section outlines the process undergone during 
the industrial case, as well as the main properties and 
examples of the modelling artefacts produced. We 
also summarize the lessons learned. Note that the 
process undergone is to a large degree but not fully an 
instantiation of the approach presented in Section 3. 
The reason is that the process has been simplified in 
order to meet the most prevailing needs and to apply 
as much as possible of the approach, within the 
limited resources assigned. 
4.1 Setting of the Case Study 
New sensors and technologies give opportunities for 
smarter fault- and interruption handling in the 
distribution (medium voltage) grid through self-
healing grid functionality. At the same time these 
technologies introduce new vulnerabilities to the 
system. To study these vulnerabilities a case study has 
been performed on detailed design of a realistic 
centralized self-healing grid, owned by a Norwegian 
DSO.  
4.1.1 Centralized Self-healing Grid 
With self-healing functionality the processes as fault 
location, isolation and restoration (FLIR) (Siirto, 
2016) are, in our context, assumed to be fully 
automated. Centralized self-healing systems are 
traditionally implemented in the control centre, but in 
this case the logic and algorithm are implemented in 
the "Master node" in the substation, as shown in 
Figure 2. This Master node collects the information 
from all self-healing nodes ("SH-nodes" in Figure 2) 
and makes the best-effort decision based on this 
information. The SH-nodes consist of fault indicators 
and remotely controlled switches. The white 
rectangles are nodes with load points. The red and 
blue lines indicate the two feeders which are radially 
operated power lines from the actual substation. The 
"NO" in Figure 2 shows the shifts from feeder 1 and 
feeder 2 and by that which loads are supplied from 
which feeder. The Master node communicates with 
the substation remote terminal unit (RTU), which 
again communicates with the control centre. The 
centralized self-healing system uses the same 
communication network as SCADA/DMS to 
communicate with remote devices such as substation 
communication. As the system is normally inside the 
same security zone as the control centre and the 
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 remote devices are normally on the outside, 
communication must pass the barriers in and out of 
the security zone (Tutvedt et al., 2017).  
4.1.2 Scope of the Analysis 
The focus of the analysis has been to protect the 
following two assets: reliability of the electric power 
system and human safety. The reliability of an electric 
power system is defined as: "probability that an 
electric power system can perform a required 
function under given conditions for a given time 
interval." (IEV 617-01-01). 
When a fault occurs in a radially operated medium 
voltage grid, all customers experience an interruption. 
The goal of self-healing is not to avoid faults, but to 
reduce the consequence in terms of interruption 
duration, which is obtained when self-healing works 
perfectly after a fault. When self-healing functionality 
fails, the interruption duration increases and may also 
be longer then without any self-healing solution. In 
this case study, risks leading to longer interruption 
durations are identified and modelled, together with 
new vulnerabilities which may introduce new fault 
types into the power system. 
In addition, safety risks caused by security risk are 
included in the analysis. This may cover safety 
aspects related to personnel working close to the 
power line or public safety, in order to ensure nobody 
gets hurt during power restoration.  
4.1.3 Assumptions and Delimitation of the 
Industrial Case  
The following assumptions were made in the case 
study as part of context establishment: 
 The self-healing starts after a fault has occurred.  
 Self-healing session terminates when the fault is 
isolated, and the power is resupplied to all 
possible end-users. The repair of the fault is not a 
part of the scope of the analysis. 
 Self-healing in the distribution grid is still at an 
early stage and under implementation. The 
centralized self-healing analysed is therefore 
based on the version/design available at the time 
of case execution. 
 Configuration of self-healing and fault handling 
of the self-healing system (i.e. if the self-healing 
functionality fails) is included in the scope.  
 It is assumed that self-healing is performed 
autonomously (That is, automatically without an 
operator involved) when the self-healing 
functionality works as intended. 
 The operator is involved in the configuration and 
the fault-handling part, i.e. if the self-healing 
functionality fails.  
4.1.4 Background of the Participants 
Involved in the Analysis 
The analysis was performed with a core team of four 
people. The main analysis was performed by the two 
analysts with 8-16 years of experience in software 
engineering and cybersecurity risk management. In 
addition, two domain experts with 6-18 years of 
relevant experience within power system reliability 
and security of electricity supply, have participated. 
From the grid company, one manager and two domain 
experts within grid operation and development, have 
been involved. The manager has 3 years of experience 
from the grid company and additional 9 years of 
experience from a technology provider in the power 
system. The operation and grid development experts 
have more than 10 years of relevant experience from 
power grid planning and operation.  
4.2 Process Outline  
The case study was conducted during the second half 
of the year 2018. The analysis was performed in the 
form of one physical and eight videoconference 
meetings in a fully realistic setting in terms of the 
scope, the objectives, the process, the risk models and 
the participants. The cybersecurity risks of the self-
healing pilot were identified and modelled, with 
respect to a specified scope and assets. The case study 
was conducted first as a part of risk modelling with 
context specification as a baseline, and then as a part 
of method evaluation with an independent risk 
analysis previously conducted by the power grid 
operator as a baseline. 
Table 2 summarizes the process undergone. For 
each workshop, we list the meeting number, the date, 
the participants, the meeting type, the meeting length, 
and activities. 
4.3 Results from the Case Study 
Figure 3 illustrates a high-level view of the risk model 
developed in the study. In the following we first 
explain the textual notation used in the model as 
shown in Figure 3 and then we explain the content of 
the risk model by referring to its elements. 
The risk model in Figure 3 has 27 threat scenarios 
(TS_01 – TS_27), seven unwanted incidents (UI_01 – 
UI_07), two assets (A1 and A2) and one indirect asset 
(A3). The digit in each vulnerability indicates the 
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Table 2: The process undergone during the case. 
 
 
number of vulnerabilities that may lead to one or 
more threat scenarios and/or unwanted incidents. For 
example, in the top-left corner of Figure 3, we see one 
vulnerability that has the digit 9 conveying that there 
are nine different vulnerabilities that may only lead to 
threat scenario TS_02. Moreover, we see that there is 
one vulnerability that may lead to both threat 
scenarios TS_02 and TS_05. Thus, the risk model in 
Figure 3 shows that there our final risk model 
contained in total 62 vulnerabilities.  
Some of the threat scenarios and unwanted 
incidents are closely related and therefore aggregated 
and illustrated by a dashed rectangle. For example, 
the aggregated threat scenario A_TS_01 consists of 
threat scenarios TS_02, TS_03 and TS_04. The model 
also shows an aggregation of unwanted incidents that 
are related (A_UI_01). In the following, we explain 
the model by referring to its elements in Figure 3. 
With respect to assets to protect, the model 
captures the following: 
 A_1: Human safety. 
 A_2: Reliability of electricity supply. 
 A_3: Security of other critical infrastructure. 
With respect to threat scenarios, the model captures 
the following: 
 A_TS_01: Malicious users access SCADA via 
underlying infrastructure or due to 
misconfiguration of the power grid and carries out 
cyber-attacks on services. 
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Figure 3: High level view of the risk model. TS means Threat Scenario. UI means Unwanted Incident. A means Asset. A_TS 
means Aggregated Threat Scenario. 
 A_TS_02: The human operators and/or the 
autonomous workflows misconfigures the grid 
based on erroneous information. 
 A_TS_03: Self-healing nodes produce erroneous 
information due to failure of sensors and 
communication channels or maliciously altered 
sensor data. 
 A_TS_04: Outdated information in the SCADA 
system prohibits the operators in getting insight 
into whether self-healing is taking place due to 
disruption of communication between the 
centralized communication unit and the SCADA 
system. 
 A TS_05: The protection/breaker is exposed to 
missing or unwanted tripping due to technical 
issues, lack of power supply from batteries, 
insufficient maintenance, or wear and tear. 
 TS_01: Unauthorized user accesses the 
communications network from associated 
infrastructure and uses that as a backdoor to 
access the smart power grid. 
 TS_22: The decision support system produces 
inadequate or misleading information. 
 TS_23: The switch links are erroneous or delayed. 
 TS_24: Automatic remote control causes a 
complex situation. 
 TS_25: Unintentional voltage setting. 
 TS_26: The self-healing connection sequence 
does not lead to isolation of the erroneous 
location. 
 TS_27: Unauthorized user exploits granted access 
to parts of the smart power grid as a backdoor. 
With respect to unwanted incidents, the model 
captures the following: 
 A_UI_01: Delayed or prevented sectioning, or 
sectioning of incorrect area. 
 UI_01: Personnel are not safe while operating in 
self-healing network. 
 UI_02: The switching system is connected 
automatically or remotely while there is ongoing 
work on the grid. 
 UI_06: Prolonged duration of interruption. 
 UI_07: Unauthorized user gains access to smart 
grid and further to other critical infrastructure. 
Due to confidentiality aspects, the power grid 
company involved in the case requested not to reveal 
all details of the risk model. However, we can 
illustrate a fragment of the model considering the 
vulnerabilities. Figure 4 illustrates the threat scenario 
TS_02 and the nine vulnerabilities that only lead to 
TS_02. 
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Figure 4: The threat scenario TS_02 and the nine 
vulnerabilities that only lead to TS_02. 
4.4 Experiences and Lessons Learned 
In the following, we summarize the experiences and 
the lessons learned from applying our approach on the 
aforementioned self-healing case. 
A thorough understanding of the context is 
crucial. In fact, a deep understanding of the self-
healing capability was gained by all analysis 
participants including the analysts, which also 
enabled an active participation in risk modelling and 
development of the preliminary model by the 
analysts. Such a deep insight into the domain is not 
assumed by the method, but was in our case 
experienced as beneficial, in spite of the additional 
resources spent on that. It is generally crucial to 
dedicate sufficient resources to context 
establishment.  
Regardless of how well the security risk analyst 
understands the context, it is crucial that the analyst 
does not develop the risk models alone. Risk 
identification triggers many useful discussions 
among the analysis participants, and helps reveal 
inconsistencies and misunderstandings. In addition, 
risk models are intended to be used by the industry 
and the domain experts, who need to be able to 
maintain the models. The optimal approach, in our 
point of view, is that the analyst presents an initial 
version of the risk model, which is then discussed, 
corrected and further developed in the group. Errors 
or missing parts in the initial models are often an 
advantage, as they trigger the discussions in the 
group. 
The analyst has to be aware of the inconsistencies 
of the terminology used in documents and the verbal 
communication among the domain experts, as well as 
between the overall stakeholders. Any such 
inconsistencies should be clarified. 
While the power grid company had considered the 
incidents believed to be of less frequent nature, our 
original model covered the incidents and 
vulnerabilities of in principle more "known" nature. 
While the grid company had applied a bottom-up 
approach to risk identification in the sense that they 
started at a lower level of abstraction driven by the 
various threat scenarios associated with the new 
capabilities in self-healing, our approach was of a 
rather top-down nature and driven by the pre-
specified asset. 
Being a driving force of the risk identification, 
assets showed to be very beneficial in order to keep 
focus on the relevant aspects of the risk model and 
ensure the right abstraction level. While the grid 
company had focused on safety, our asset was 
reliability of electricity supply. This made it possible 
to complement the originally separate results into a 
merged and comprehensive model. 
An important property of the model was that it 
was possible to express all information into one 
merged model, so that the complexity and all relevant 
relationships were explicit and fully reflected in a 
single comprehensive overview.  
Our original model had explicitly focused on the 
cybersecurity risks that could impact the reliability of 
electric supply, while the risk model of the grid 
company had addressed the risks of more general type 
that could impact the safety. The final merged model 
included all relevant aspects and showed how the 
cybersecurity risks affect the assets concerning not 
only the resilience of the power grid and the systems 
associated, but also the human safety. This has 
enabled us to explicitly visualize the dependencies 
between the several types of risks, on all assets. As 
such, the risk model has bridged the gap between 
cybersecurity and safety within our context. 
Several of the analysis participants did not have 
prior experiences in either CORAS or graphical risk 
modelling in general. Still, the risk model was 
gradually updated into new versions through iterative 
and thorough discussions among all the participants. 
Our observation is that the model offered an adequate 
level of abstraction that made it easy to understand 
and contribute to.  
Through the final risk model, we were able to 
express all cybersecurity relevant risks and 
dependencies among various risk elements that were 
suggested by the analysis group, either based on own 
knowledge, or based on the references provided 
through context establishment. 
The grid company expressed that the graphical 
risk modelling was appropriate and enabled the model 
to be significantly more structured and 
comprehensible. 
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 Prior to and fully independently of our case study, 
a set of so-called future scenarios, i.e. various 
contexts that illustrate characteristics associated with 
power grids of the future, had been brainstormed and 
described through a workshop. The workshop 
participants were system operators, technology 
providers and researchers, all from the energy 
domain. The future scenarios were, after our case 
study, used for the purpose of the quality assurance of 
the final risk model. At his stage, no further 
modifications of the model were found necessary.  
5 DISCUSSION 
Based on our experience, we discuss and evaluate in 
this section the fulfilment of the requirements one 
through five defined in Section 1. The second part of 
this section discusses the main threats to validity and 
reliability of the results. 
5.1 To What Degree Are the 
Requirements Fulfilled? 
Requirement 1: Our estimate based on the case study 
indicates that the method for cybersecurity risk 
identification described in this paper amounts to ca. 
150 man-hours in total spent by the analysts. This 
includes ca. 23 hours spent on meetings 1 to 9 as 
described in Section 4.2. Ca. 127 man-hours were 
spent on work between the meetings. That is, hours 
spent by the analyst team before and after each 
meeting including the process of establishing the 
context, identifying risks, preparing the meetings, and 
taking notes and correcting the model during and after 
the meetings. The authors of the CORAS risk analysis 
method state that the expected effort required to carry 
out a CORAS analysis is typically from 150 to 300 
hours (Lund et al., 2010), while in our case we spent 
in total ca. 150 hours. This indicated that the amount 
spent on carrying out the approach outlined in this 
paper is reasonable. It should also be taken into 
account that our analysts gained such a deep 
understanding of the context, that they were enabled 
to actively identify and model risks. This is not a 
general assumption within the above mentioned 
budgets. Our approach is light-weight in the sense 
that it does not contain steps such as risk estimation, 
evaluation and treatment, which are typically found 
in full scale risk analysis methods. This also removes 
the overhead in the context establishment phase 
where, in our case, it is not necessary to define 
likelihood and consequence scales often used to 
estimate and evaluate risks. Of course, these are steps 
that are necessary when there exists data to support 
risk estimation and when the goal is to estimate and 
evaluate risks. However, as pointed out in Section 1, 
self-healing within smart power grids is a state-of-
the-art approach of limited maturity and empirical 
evidence, which would be needed for risk estimation. 
To fully justify Requirement 1, we would have to 
quantify the benefit, as well as the cost. This is very 
hard, and we have not attempted to do so. However, 
the feedback received and the experiences indicate 
that the benefit justifies the effort, meaning that our 
customized method is reasonably cost effective as 
well as light-weight. 
Requirement 2: As outlined in Section 4.2, the 
participants vary with respect to background. The 
domain experts were experts in smart power grids and 
had barely limited background in cybersecurity. Even 
so, after a brief introduction of the cyber risk concepts 
explained in Section 3, they quickly grasped the 
concepts and were able to actively contribute to the 
model development. Moreover, the comments, 
suggestions and discussions throughout the process 
demonstrated that all participants were able to 
understand the details of the evolving model. This is 
further substantiated by earlier studies which have 
empirically shown that the graphical notation used in 
our method is intuitively simple for stakeholders with 
very different backgrounds (Volden-Freberg and 
Erdogan, 2019, Solhaug and Stølen, 2013). 
Requirement 3: Prior to the study reported in this 
paper, it was not clear whether the modelling 
language used in our method had sufficient 
expressiveness in terms of capturing relevant risks of 
smart power grids. As part of the study, we were able 
to capture all vulnerabilities, threat scenarios, 
unwanted incidents and assets identified by the 
domain experts. Even if the various threat scenarios, 
vulnerabilities, unwanted incidents and assets were 
sometimes different in nature (technical versus 
business risks), no relevant risks were left out. This 
was pointed out by the case providers (the DSO) to be 
an advantage because it helped understanding the 
relationship between high-level business risks and 
low-level technical risks. It is therefore reasonable to 
argue that our risk modelling approach has sufficient 
expressiveness to capture relevant aspects of the 
cybersecurity risk picture in the context of smart 
power grids. 
Requirement 4: As discussed in the previous 
sections, self-healing smart power grids are still 
immature and advancing. Thus, there is little 
experience in their usage including operational data. 
There is also very little experience in terms of cyber 
risk incidents in this context. Due to these factors, we 
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 have deliberately designed our method to facilitate a 
rather simple modelling language in which only the 
necessary risk-related concepts are used: threat 
scenarios, vulnerabilities, unwanted incidents and 
assets to protect. As illustrated in Figure 3 and Figure 
4, and explained in Section 3, these risk model 
elements are left to the analyst to describe at a 
qualitative level. No unavailable information of 
unrealistic precision is demanded, unless possible and 
desired to include. The analyst is therefore free to 
choose the level of abstraction in which the threat 
scenarios, vulnerabilities, and their relationships, are 
described. This flexibility eases the risk identification 
process and does not "lock" the analysts to think at 
one level of abstraction (for example, identifying 
risks only at technical level or only at business level, 
or having to deal with quantitative risk estimates).  
Requirement 5: As illustrated in Figure 3 and figure 
4, the risk model produced by our method is capable 
of illustrating the risk picture both for the whole 
context and the detailed parts of the scope of analysis.  
The risk model in Figure 3 illustrates a high-level 
view of the risk picture in terms of threat scenarios 
(including aggregated threat scenarios and 
aggregated unwanted incidents), unwanted incidents 
caused by threat scenarios, assets harmed, and the 
number of vulnerabilities associated with the threat 
scenarios and unwanted incidents. We could have 
chosen to provide unique IDs for each vulnerability 
and illustrate all in the high-level risk model in Figure 
3. In that case, we would have had to add 62 
vulnerability icons instead of the 30 shown. However, 
to support scalability, we chose to aggregate the 
vulnerabilities in the high-level risk model by only 
illustrating the number of vulnerabilities associated 
with the various elements of the risk model, as well 
as illustrating aggregated threat scenarios and 
aggregated unwanted incidents as explained in 
Section 4.3. Figure 4, on the other hand, illustrates a 
fragment of the detailed risk model in which we can 
see all risk model elements including their 
description. 
The advantage of the high-level risk model in 
Figure 3 is that the analysts as well as the domain 
experts get a top-down view which helps obtaining an 
overall risk picture by a quick glance. This helps 
identifying the most vulnerable parts of the target 
system, as well as understanding the chain of events 
in how certain threat scenarios (or group of threat 
scenarios) lead to other threat scenarios and/or 
unwanted incidents, which ultimately harms the 
assets. The advantage of the detailed risk model 
(partly illustrated in Figure 4), on the other hand, is to 
get a more refined view of the risk model and obtain 
detailed description of the various aggregated 
vulnerabilities, threat scenarios, and unwanted 
incidents. 
5.2 Threats to Validity and Reliability  
Apart from certain parts of the follow-up phase, we 
have, through the trial, instantiated the entire 
approach. Application of the approach on a case with 
limited empirical evidence, has clear limitations in 
terms of representativeness of the target of the 
analysis. Still, the results of the trial indicate 
feasibility of applying the approach. The fact that new 
knowledge was gained about the target of analysis 
and its security risks, suggests usefulness of the 
approach. 
Correctness and relevance of the results are 
partially evaluated through the close interaction with 
the industry pilot, and through the future scenarios. A 
retrospective evaluation would have been 
appropriate, but the industry pilot has not been 
running for long enough in order to have sufficient 
retrospective picture of security risks. Instead, we 
have relied on the analysis group as well as the 
industry partner, together representing relevant and 
broad domain knowledge. 
It is, in terms of evaluation of performance of the 
approach, a weakness that the analysts who tried out 
the approach also participated in design of the 
customized version of the approach. As such, it is also 
a threat to reliability of the evaluation results, as we 
cannot know to what degree another analysis group 
would have obtained the same results. 
There is a need for a baseline for comparing this 
approach with the alternative risk identification 
methods, in order to assess characteristics such as 
usability, scalability, usefulness and cost-
effectiveness of our approach compared to the 
alternative ones. We have already partially compared 
the evaluation results with the performance of 
CORAS. Further empirical evaluation in other 
realistic settings is, however, still needed due to 
threats to validity and reliability. 
Overall, we have drawn important findings and 
learned lessons from developing this smart-grid-
customized approach to cybersecurity risk 
identification, and from trying it out in the industrial 
case. Although the mentioned threats to validity and 
reliability are present in the study, we argue that the 
results indicate feasibility and usefulness of the 
approach. Important findings are also obtained on 
strengths and weaknesses of the approach, and they 
will guide the directions for our future work. 
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 6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
Smart power grids are evolving into increasingly 
complex cyber-physical systems that introduce 
numerous kinds of interdependencies and 
vulnerabilities. This poses new requirements to 
cybersecurity management. As a result, state-of-the-
art to risk identification is being challenged. In this 
paper we have proposed a customized four-step 
approach for identification and modelling of 
cybersecurity risks in the context of smart power 
grids. Our approach is, to a high degree, based on 
parts of the CORAS method for model-based risk 
analysis. Compared to CORAS, the process and the 
modelling approach we have applied are simplified 
and partially adapted in order to meet the identified 
requirements. The qualitative nature of the model 
gave the needed simplicity. The approach has been 
tried out on a realistic industrial case. The context of 
the case was a centralized self-healing pilot (i.e. a 
limited pilot installation of self-healing functionality 
within a medium voltage power distribution grid). We 
argue that our approach to some extent fulfils the pre-
identified requirements. However, there are at the 
same time, clear limitations in terms of reliability of 
the current results, due to e.g. bare evaluation of the 
approach on one case with limited empirical 
evidence. Although the mentioned threats to validity 
and reliability are present in the study, we argue that 
the results indicate feasibility and usefulness of the 
approach. 
The next step will be to test out the developed 
approach on another case study in the smart grid 
domain. This will give us the opportunity to further 
analyse the scalability, performance, relevance and 
representativeness of our approach. Another next step 
is to develop recommendations and guidelines for 
cybersecurity risk identification in the smart grid 
domain based on our approach. This requires further 
case studies and adjustments according to our 
mentioned strengths and weaknesses. 
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